Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

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Meeting of Experts
Geneva, 23–27 August 2010

Report of the Meeting of Experts

I. Introduction

1. The Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC/CONF.VI/6), in the Decisions and Recommendations section, contained the following decision:

"The Conference decides:

(a) To hold four annual meetings of the States Parties of one week duration each year commencing in 2007, prior to the Seventh Review Conference, to be held not later than the end of 2011, to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action on:

(i) Ways and means to enhance national implementation, including enforcement of national legislation, strengthening of national institutions and coordination among national law enforcement institutions;

(ii) Regional and sub-regional cooperation on implementation of the Convention;

(iii) National, regional and international measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity, including laboratory safety and security of pathogens and toxins;

(iv) Oversight, education, awareness raising and adoption and/or development of codes of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse in the context of advances in bio-science and bio-technology research with the potential of use for purposes prohibited by the Convention;

(v) With a view to enhancing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes, promoting capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases: (1) for States Parties in need of assistance, identifying requirements and requests for capacity

enhancement; and (2) from States Parties in a position to do so, and international organizations, opportunities for providing assistance related to these fields;

(vi) Provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations upon request by any State Party in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, including improving national capabilities for disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and public health systems.

(b) Each meeting of the States Parties will be prepared by a one week meeting of experts. The topics for consideration at each annual meeting of States Parties will be as follows: items (i) and (ii) will be considered in 2007; items (iii) and (iv) in 2008; item (v) in 2009; and item (vi) in 2010. The first meeting will be chaired by a representative of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States, the second by a representative of the Eastern European Group, the third by a representative of the Western Group, and the fourth by a representative of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States.

(c) The meetings of experts will prepare factual reports describing their work;

(d) All meetings, both of experts and of States Parties, will reach any conclusions or results by consensus;

(e) The Seventh Review Conference will consider the work and outcome of these meetings and decide on any further action."

2. By resolution 64/70, adopted without a vote on 2 December 2009, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to continue to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Governments of the Convention and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Review Conferences, including all assistance to the annual meetings of the States parties and the meetings of experts..

II. Organization of the Meeting of Experts

3. In accordance with the decision of the Sixth Review Conference, the 2010 Meeting of Experts was convened at the Palais des Nations in Geneva from 23 to 27 August 2010, under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Pedro Oyarce of Chile.

4. At its first meeting, on 23 August 2010, the Meeting of Experts adopted its agenda (BWC/MSP/2010/MX/1) and programme of work (BWC/MSP/2010/MX/2) as proposed by the Chairman. The Chairman also drew the attention of delegations to three background papers prepared by the Implementation Support Unit (BWC/MSP/2010/MX/INF.1, /INF.2, and /INF.3).

5. At the same meeting, following a suggestion by the Chairman, the Meeting of Experts adopted as its rules of procedure, *mutatis mutandis*, the rules of procedure of the Sixth Review Conference, as contained in Annex II of the Final Document of the Review Conference (BWC/CONF.VI/6).

6. Mr. Richard Lennane, Head of the Implementation Support Unit, served as Secretary of the Meeting of Experts. Mr. Piers Millett, Political Affairs Officer, Implementation Support Unit, served as Deputy Secretary. Ms. Ngoc Phuong Huynh, Associate Political Affairs Officer, Implementation Support Unit, served in the Secretariat.

III. Participation at the Meeting of Experts

7. Eighty-nine States Parties to the Convention participated in the Meeting of Experts as follows: Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen.

8. In addition, four states that had signed the Convention but had not yet ratified it participated in the Meeting of Experts without taking part in the making of decisions, as provided for in rule 44, paragraph 1, of the rules of procedure: Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Syrian Arab Republic.

9. Two states, Angola and Israel, neither parties nor signatories to the Convention, participated in the Meeting of Experts as observers, in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 2 (a).

10. The United Nations, including the Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), attended the Meeting of Experts in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 3.

11. The European Union, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) were granted observer status to participate in the Meeting of Experts in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 4.

12. In addition, at the invitation of the Chairman, in recognition of the special nature of the topic under consideration at this Meeting and without creating a precedent, two scientific, professional and academic experts participated in informal exchanges in the open sessions as guests of the Meeting of Experts.

13. Sixteen non-governmental organizations and research institutes attended the Meeting of Experts under rule 44, paragraph 5.

14. A list of all participants in the Meeting of Experts is contained in documents BWC/MSP/2010/MX/INF.4 and /Add.1.

IV. Work of the Meeting of Experts

15. In accordance with the programme of work (BWC/MSP/2010/MX/2), the Meeting of Experts heard introductory statements from the following 24 States Parties: Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia (on behalf of the Western Group, and later in its national capacity), Belarus, Belgium (on behalf of the European Union), Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba (on behalf of the Group of the Non-aligned Movement and Other States), India, Indonesia,

Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the United States of America. The Meeting also heard an introductory statement from the World Organisation for Animal Health.

16. Between 24 and 27 August, the Meeting of Experts held a number of sessions devoted to agenda item 5: Consideration of the provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations upon request by any State Party in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, including improving national capabilities for disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and public health systems. Twenty-seven States Parties, eight international organisations and two guests of the Meeting made presentations or statements during these sessions.

17. The Chairman, under his own responsibility and initiative, prepared a paper listing considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions on the topics under discussion at the Meeting. The Meeting of Experts noted that this paper had not been agreed and had no status. It was the Chairman's view that the paper could assist delegations in their preparations for the Meeting of States Parties in December 2010 and in its consideration of how best to "discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action on" the topic in accordance with the decision of the Sixth Review Conference. The paper prepared by the Chairman is attached as Annex I to this Report.

18. In the course of its work, the Meeting of Experts was able to draw on a number of working papers submitted by States Parties, as well as on statements and presentations made by States Parties, international organizations and guests of the Meeting, which were circulated in the Meeting.

V. Documentation

19. A list of official documents of the Meeting of Experts, including the working papers submitted by States Parties, is contained in Annex II to this Report. All documents on this list are available on the Implementation Support Unit website at http://www.unog.ch/bwc and through the United Nations Official Document System (ODS), at http://documents.un.org.

VI. Conclusion of the Meeting of Experts

20. At its closing meeting on 27 August 2010, the Meeting of Experts heard an interim report from the Chairman on activities to secure universal adherence to the Convention, in accordance with the decision of the Sixth Review Conference. The Meeting noted that the Chairman would prepare the provisional agenda and programme of work for approval and adoption at the Meeting of States Parties to be held from 6 to 10 December 2010.

21. At the same meeting, the Meeting of Experts adopted its Report by consensus, as contained in documents BWC/MSP/2010/MX/CRP.1 and /CRP.2, as orally amended, to be issued as document BWC/MSP/2010/MX/3.

Annex I

Considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions on the topics under discussion at the Meeting

Agenda item 5: Consideration of the provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations upon request by any State Party in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, including improving national capabilities for disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and public health systems.

Note: the source is given using the following codes: P = presentation (with date); S = statement (with date); WP = working paper (with number). See also the list of abbreviations of delegation names at the end of this annex.

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
Cuba (on behalf of NAM)	The BTWC can never disregard one of the characteristics of its membership: the difference between its States Parties regarding the level of development and their national capabilities and resources.	S 23/08
Cuba (on behalf of NAM)	The BTWC as the first disarmament multilateral treaty banning a whole category of weapons of mass destruction, shows a relevant example of what can be achieved through multilateral negotiations in response to the challenges faced by mankind.	S 23/08
Cuba (on behalf of NAM)	There is an urgency for all States parties to the BTWC to work towards the universal adherence, as well as the strengthening and improving of the effectiveness of the implementation of the Convention, in order to be in a position to really address this concern.	S 23/08
Cuba (on behalf of NAM)	Regrettably the long sought aspiration of member states for resumption of the negotiation for convening a legally binding instrument to comprehensively strengthen the convention was rejected again during the last December meeting. We urge the responsible of that situation to reconsider its policy towards this convention in the light of persistent requests of other parties.	S 23/08
Cuba (on behalf of NAM)	The only sustainable method to achieve this goal is though multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non-discriminatory, legally binding agreement, dealing with all the Articles of the Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner that can not exclude the negotiation and establishment of a verification mechanism.	S 23/08
Cuba (on behalf of NAM)	Although one of the main purposes of the implementation of Article X of the Convention is precisely to narrow these gaps, the BTWC lacks an adequate mechanism for effective implementation of Article X… At the 2009 Expert Meeting our Group introduced a Working Paper on the establishment of a mechanism for an effective implementation of Article X (BWC/MSP/2009/MX/WP.24). We consider that its content is directly related with the topic we will discuss, and contains several proposals that could be a good basis for future agreements.	S 23/08
Cuba (on behalf of NAM)	The topic of this year's Meeting of Experts … is of utmost interest not only to our Group but also to all States Parties to the Convention, particularly developing countries.	S 23/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	It is fundamental to promote regional and international cooperation to provide an efficient response and deliver timely assistance to the affected countries.	S 23/08
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	[Issues to be explored:] exchanging lessons learnt with partners as regards detection and response, identifying best practices to respond to requests from States Parties in need of assistance and ways to rapidly channel this assistance, improving cooperation and coordination mechanisms as regards preparation, detection and response with international partners in case of an alleged attack or exploring ways to strengthen detection, surveillance and diagnosis capabilities.	S 23/08
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	The risks and threats of CBRN incidents could be of natural, accidental or intentional origin, including terrorist acts. While so far major incidents involving CBRN materials have been relatively few, the potential consequences of such incidents could be particularly serious and of a multiple nature.	S 23/08
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	Mitigating the effects of CBRN incidents require early detection and diagnosis, followed by prompt activation of an effective response.	S 23/08 & WP.3
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	National implementation of the WHO International Health Regulations deserves particular attention since the IHR aim to prevent, protect against, control and respond to the international spread of disease while avoiding unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade.	S 23/08
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	International cooperation involving and supporting international organizations like WHO, FAO, OIE and Interpol as well as with non-governmental actors working on infectious diseases will also in the future be the key to strengthening structures and capacities in disease surveillance, detection, diagnostics, and containment of infectious diseases. Such cooperation is both consistent with the BTWC, and serves to support and strengthen the Convention	S 23/08
United States	Effective action on the provision of assistance cannot begin with a case of use or alleged use. It is the steps that we take before an event that determine how successful we will be in dealing with an attack, or other disease outbreak, should it take place.	S 23/08
United States	The more rapidly and accurately a state can identify a threat, assess its needs, and communicate with the international community, the more effective international assistance and response can be. This suggests that some of the most important measures to achieve effective international assistance and coordination in response to alleged use of biological weapons are measures that are undertaken before an event: training, capacity building and the sharing of experiences and best practices that will promote local preparedness. Not because such preparedness is an alternative to international assistance in the event of a biological incident, but because it is critical to ensuring effective international assistance.	S 23/08
United States	It is important to work before such an event to identify and resolve legal, regulatory, and other barriers to effective multilateral cooperation, such as inconsistent standards for forensic identification of agents, vaccine liability, and licensing for emergency use of medical countermeasures.	S 23/08
United States	Response to a suspicious outbreak or BW attack is likely to involve many sectors of government and society. There are investigatory elements, through which we may seek to determine what sort of illness we are confronting, whether it has been deliberately caused, and if so, by whom. There are public health elements, including the rapid identification and treatment of those who have been exposed, and evidence-based steps to prevent	S 23/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	further spread. Depending on the circumstances, there are also very likely to be other legal, political, and security-based elements to response.	
Russian Federation	Consideration and adoption of necessary measures to prevent and eliminate the outbreaks of infectious diseases are the domestic prerogative of States	S 23/08
Russian Federation	To ensure preparedness for possible outbreaks of dangerous infectious diseases, States Parties should take appropriate national measures with a view, in particular, to improving the means of indication and identification of biological agents, diagnosis, methods of infections treatment, and the creation of adequate supplies of vaccines and drugs.	S 23/08
Russian Federation	National epidemiological services must focus their efforts on timely diagnosis of an infectious agent, localization of an outbreak, provisions of medical assistance and prevention of new diseases, ensuring of sanitary and epidemiological stability in the emergency zone.	S 23/08
Russian Federation	If a State does not have adequate resources, it can appeal for help to other BWC States Parties or to international organizations such as WHO, FAO, OIE.	S 23/08
Russian Federation	The mechanism of UN Secretary-General provided for by the UNGA resolution A/447561 of 4 October 1989 is the main international instrument to investigate the alleged use of biological weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant norms of customary international law.	S 23/08
Russian Federation	A State Party to the Convention can only appeal for an investigation of the alleged use of biological and toxin weapons on its own territory. In order to avoid abuses, we should exclude the possibility of initiating an investigation at the request of one State Party on the territory of another State Party.	S 23/08
Russian Federation	The existing international legal framework for providing assistance to a State in case of alleged use against it of biological or toxin weapons is not sufficient. There is no full understanding of how to act in case there is a necessity to investigate a possible use of bioweapons. There are no clear procedures for submitting requests and providing assistance. These issues are extremely important and should be discussed at the Seventh BWC Review Conference and, in case a relevant decision is adopted, be included in the agenda of the meeting during the next intersessional period.	S 23/08
Indonesia	Every individual state should assume responsibility for the safety and security of all biological materials and facilities, related to both humans and animals, in their respective countries. We must all work to ensure that such materials and facilities are safe and secure from theft, sabotage, unauthorized release and other illicit activities.	S 23/08
Indonesia	As clearly stipulated in Article X of the BTWC, any State party has the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific technology relating to the peaceful use of biological agents and toxins. Further scientific development in biological agents and pathogens would significantly contribute to the prevention and cure of existing and emerging diseases.	S 23/08
Indonesia	The intentional and unintentional release of dangerous biological materials or pathogens presents a serious risk not only to the public and the environment but also to the scientists and practitioners working with these dangerous materials.	S 23/08
Indonesia	Therefore, it is important for the researchers and practitioners, such as those who work in laboratories or research facilities, to understand their role and to fully understand the	S 23/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	critical importance of taking safety and security precautions.	
Indonesia	A major challenge in global disease surveillance and detection ... is not just the detection and reporting of well-known infectious diseases, but also the ability to detect novel, emerging, or reemerging infectious diseases in relatively low-tech environments. There is also a corresponding need to develop complementary detection systems for infectious diseases which go beyond the realm of the more traditional surveillance systems and approaches.	S 23/08
China	Timely and effective response and assistance maintain close relevance to the provisions of the investigation and assistance of the Convention and also a kind of practical need of many States Parties.	S 23/08 & WP.9
China	States Parties bear primary responsibilities in response to and investigation of alleged use of biological weapons. Therefore States Parties should take appropriate measures to establish and improve response and investigation mechanisms according to their own circumstances and enhance their capacity building in disease surveillance, anti-bioterrorism, public health response and investigation.	S 23/08 & WP.9
China	According to Article VII of the Convention, States Parties may provide assistance upon request of the State Party in the face of danger as a result of alleged use of biological weapons	S 23/08
China	The relevant international organizations, such as the World Health Organization, World Organization for Animal Health, and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations can play an active role in helping States Parties enhancing their capacity building in the field of disease surveillance, control and response. Upon requests from States Parties, the above-mentioned international organizations may, within their mandates, provide assistance in public health and humanitarian field to States Parties which have practical difficulties.	S 23/08 & WP.9
China	Investigation of alleged use of biological weapons is a complicated and sensitive issue. Any State Party may lodge a complaint with the Security Council according to Article VI of the Convention. If the Security Council decides to initiate an investigation, such investigation should be conducted under the aegis of the Security Council.	S 23/08 & WP.9
Malaysia	Encourage other States Parties who are in a position to do so, to extend such assistance to other States Parties who need it, as this would inevitably improve national capabilities for disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and public health systems.	S 23/08
Pakistan	In countries with deficient capacities and weak public health systems, disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis are serious challenges, which can be overcome only through cooperation and assistance amongst the States Parties and through coordination and support from the relevant organizations in accordance with their mandates.	S 23/08
Pakistan	We should not treat this issue as part of the North versus South divide. Rather this should be pursued as a joint venture to ensure global safety and security.	S 23/08
Pakistan	International cooperation, assistance and information and technology exchanges in the field of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment in the context of the BWC framework is therefore, of pivotal importance for successful implementation of the Convention. It will also facilitate compliance with the revised International Health Regulations (IHR). But we must remember that the IHR and BWC are two distinct frameworks with different parameters and the two have been negotiated with different	S 23/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	scopes and purposes.	
Pakistan	No country is safe unless everyone is safe and a collective and cooperative effort is the only recipe.	S 23/08
Pakistan	National capacity of a state to effectively deal with any disease resulting from a biological weapon attack is essentially dependent upon the level of development of its health facilities and expertise. Development of national capacity to response to exigent and emergent challenges from a possible biological weapons attack forms the cornerstone of the national implementation strategy.	S 23/08
Pakistan	The mechanism of Review Conferences has enabled the BWC to remain in step with the changes in the field of sciences as well as the transformed global strategic landscape. The Review Conference must positively address the issue of a verification protocol, seek enhanced implementation of the Convention, particularly Article X and promote universalization.	S 23/08
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Assistance to any State Party which has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention by another Party or by a non Party, irrespective of sources, should immediately be provided upon its request.	S 23/08
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Consider the detailed procedure for assistance in order to ensure that States Parties, if requested, would provide timely emergency assistance. Should a request for assistance be made, the procedure shall facilitate the prompt response by States Parties in order to dispatch timely emergency assistance and humanitarian assistance to the requesting State Party which has been exposed to a danger as a result of the threat or use of biological weapons. The next Review Conference would be an excellent opportunity to further discuss this issue and to make a decision on developing such a procedure and in this context mandate the United Nations relevant body to establish an inventory of the types of assistance that States Parties could provide pursuant to Article VII if requested.	S 23/08
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	The main responsibility for providing assistance, if the provisions of Article VII of the Convention is invoked, lies with States Parties	S 23/08
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	The United Nations, with the help of States Parties as well as appropriate intergovernmental organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health, the World Health Organization subject to full observance of their mandates, could play a coordinating and complementary role.	S 23/08
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	States Parties' national preparedness considerably contributes to enhancing international capabilities for response, investigation and mitigation of outbreaks of disease, including those due to alleged use of biological and toxin weapons.	S 23/08
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Strengthening national preparedness of States Parties, in particular that of the developing countries is a matter of high importance. Enhancing the national capabilities of the States Parties requires international cooperation as provided for in Article X of the BWC.	S 23/08
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	International and regional peace and security would be enhanced though universal adherence to the Convention. There are still a number of non parties with advanced biotechnology and a policy of biological ambiguity, situated in volatile regions which have neither signed nor ratified the Convention and therefore pose a serious threat to the international and regional peace and security.	S 23/08
Iran (Islamic	It is a source of concern and a matter of regret that lack of proper implementation of Article X prevents the less developed and developing States parties from fulfilling their	S 23/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
Republic of)	programs in this regard, including their plans to improve the effectiveness of national capability and preparedness for diagnosis, surveillance, prevention, control and treatment of diseases caused by incidental as well intentional outbreaks of diseases as referred to by Article VII of the Convention.	
India	Institutional mechanisms for combating of outbreaks of infectious diseases remain the same, irrespective of whether the outbreak is natural or a result of deliberate use of biological weapons. However, surveillance and detection of a natural or deliberate outbreak of disease will have implications with respect to the Convention.	S 23/08
India	Facilities for detection, diagnosis, production of prophylactic vaccines and effective treatment need to be developed and established for establishing proper biodefence measures.	S 23/08
India	International cooperation is an imperative both in cases of investigating alleged use of biological weapons and mitigation and control of the effects of the attack. Full and effective implementation of Article X of the Convention is therefore important.	S 23/08
India	The primary responsibility for surveillance and combating of outbreaks of infectious diseases rests with the States Parties.	S 23/08
India	Encourage States Parties to the Convention … to provide ready assistance to other States Parties in need for developing national capabilities in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.	S 23/08
India	Encourage … the concerned international organizations to provide ready assistance to other States Parties in need for developing national capabilities in accordance with the provisions of the Convention	S 23/08
Mexico	The development of human capacity for oversight of illness [is] important, … early warning [is] important, and the recognition of new diseases and risks are key for the appropriate preparedness to face threats such as the threats posed by biological weapons. It is in this framework that international cooperation is key.	S 23/08
Mexico	Strengthen synergies between the international organizations that are competent in this matter and the instruments that make up the international legal framework operating in this area and the Convention that brings us together.	S 23/08
Morocco	The promotion of assistance and coordination in the context of the Convention will be a key factor to strengthen the universality thereof.	S 23/08
Morocco	Assistance and cooperation in the context of building national capacities in the areas of oversight and screening and diagnosis of illnesses would make it possible to fight in a coordinated fashion against the use of WMD.	S 23/08
Morocco	It is key for the States to strengthen the capabilities of their health systems in general and the capabilities of their laboratories in the areas of surveillance screening and diagnosis of illness. This can only occur, especially for developing countries, through the assistance of those countries that are able to provide assistance and through regional cooperation and international cooperation.	S 23/08
Argentina	The need to give a coordinated response on the part of States Parties to the Convention so as to prevent and combat the possible use of biological weapons cannot but take into account the role played by existing organizations.	S 23/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
Argentina	Both from the viewpoint of security (so as to investigate the origins of the alleged use as well as to identify and prosecute the culprits) and also from the viewpoint of the health response – that is, mitigating and monitoring the effects of a possible attack – we have at our disposal a significant number of tools which need to be identified so as to strengthen our national, regional and global capacities. These capacities are of fundamental importance for us to be able to achieve in a comprehensive way the objectives of this Convention.	S 23/08
Argentina	The investigating mechanism established under the United Nations Secretary General is the method of investigating cases concerning the presumed use of biological weapons which, at the same time, makes it possible to channel international aid, allowing for a rapid response and to contain the attack. This mechanism, taken together with what is provided for in Article VI of the Convention, ensures that these investigations are carried out in a systematic, scientific and objective way.	S 23/08
Argentina	Highlight the WHO's public health emergency programme in which this organization commits itself, inter alia, to maintaining an ongoing cooperation mechanism with the Office for Disarmament Affairs so as to provide technical support to the investigating mechanism into the alleged use of biological weapons. WHO's role is vital in terms of capacity to respond to supposed use, developing systems to coordinate the activities among Member States and to enhance warning mechanisms, detection and response mechanisms, inter alia.	S 23/08
Argentina	Uphold the importance acquired by other organizations such as INTERPOL in the area of investigating so that, when dealing with an emergency, one does not leave the task of investigating and searching out the perpetrators to some sort of secondary status.	S 23/08
Argentina	It is necessary to carry out major efforts to strengthen the training of experts at national, regional and international levels and it is also important to have continuity in the preparations and security of professionals and methods of contracting have to be looked into.	S 23/08
Algeria	Need to improve national monitoring and diagnostic and recovery procedures for diseases as well as improving public health systems.	S 23/08
Algeria	[Aim for] a joint understanding of the tools necessary and commitments that need to be undertaken in order to allow States to exercise their international responsibilities in this area as pursuant to Articles V, VI, VII and X of the Convention. In this context, we need to expose objective mechanisms that can determine and trigger the necessary assistance in cases of allegations that might involve security dimensions and means that an attack has been launched.	S 23/08
Algeria	Think about possibilities for updating and improving the investigation mechanism under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United nations in order to take into account developments in biology and biotechnology.	S 23/08
Algeria	Relevant international organizations, such as the World Organization for Animal Health, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Plant Protection Convention could also provide valuable assistance in coordinating and supplying assistance.	S 23/08
Brazil	Need to have further improvements made in the mechanisms relating to national response capacities and above all the capacities for the identification and monitoring of a possible incident of the use of biological or chemical or toxin weapons.	S 23/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
Brazil	Although events of this kind are not common, it is vital for a country to be prepared in the form of an effective national plan of action which it can put into place in a swift manner.	S 23/08
Brazil	Under Article VI of the BWC, it is also relevant for there to be efficient coordination between States and the relevant international organizations in the cases of assistance and investigation in particular.	S 23/08
Brazil	Strengthen technical capacities, training of specialists, and this is particularly in the area of forensic science, and also assessing the strengths and weaknesses of laboratory networks.	S 23/08
OIE	Day to day preparedness against ordinary disease outbreaks offers the best protection against unusual, deliberate, and accidental releases. Therefore assessments in mechanisms to prevent and respond to natural disease events will protect against accidental and deliberate release, and ultimately this is more sustainable.	S 23/08
OIE	Global disease surveillance networks are of critical importance in facilitating a response to a disease event, whatever the source, and the OIE is responsible for transparency of the global animal disease situation. Its Members have a legal obligation to report outbreaks of the most important and severe animal diseases, including those threatening human health, and emerging diseases to OIE so that OIE can alert the international community early allowing a rapid and effective international response.	S 23/08
OIE	The OIE sets Standards to ensure early detection of disease and to prevent further international spread through trade and movements of animals, animal products and animal pathogens. OIE also sets standards, in collaboration with WHO, for diagnostic testing, safe vaccine production, and biosafety and biosecurity for Veterinary Laboratories and Animal Facilities. Ultimately, compliance with OIE standards will provide disease security and will reduce the health and economic costs of animal disease.	S 23/08
OIE	The OIE Experts play a key role in the international response to animal disease events. They are responsible for providing international support for accurate and rapid disease confirmation followed by characterisation of the disease agent, which may elucidate the source of the outbreak and whether it was the result of bioterrorism. In cases where animal disease pathogens are alleged to have been used as bio-weapons OIE may offer expertise to UNODA to assist in confirming or denying this. OIE experts are also responsible for reporting positive laboratory results to OIE, for capacity building in developing countries, and for the production and distribution of diagnostic reagents.	S 23/08
OIE	Global security from animal diseases needs universally strong and well governed Veterinary Services because a disease outbreak, deliberate release of pathogen or a breach in laboratory biosecurity in one country can threaten many others.	S 23/08
OIE	Today many countries suffer from weak and poorly governed Veterinary Services and there is an urgent need to address this.	S 23/08
OIE	OIE and FAO have also established mechanisms with WHO to facilitate rapid and efficient sharing of information and to ensure a coordinated response to public health threats posed by animal diseases including zoonoses. These international response mechanisms account for threats from deliberate or accidental release of pathogens as well as from natural events.	S 23/08
OIE	Coordination at the international level is essential to ensure global disease security through bio-threat reduction.	S 23/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
Japan	Effective coordination and technical assistance with local governments will be essential for early detection and effective response to biological events. • Tools to assist early detection of the events • Tools to assist rapid and accurate laboratory diagnosis • Easily applied in the local governments and laboratories	P 24/08
Canada	Cooperation and planning between public health (PH) and law enforcement (LE) can lead to successful multi-agency approaches for biosecurity at mass gathering and high security events. This team approach enhances both PH and LE abilities to respond effectively to unexpected outbreaks or criminal acts pertaining to biosecurity.	P 24/08
Canada	Food is a vulnerable target for intentional contamination and we all need to work together to mitigate this vulnerability	P 24/08
France	Proper identification is central in preventing and properly treating mass infections. Rapidly available diagnostic tools can help identifying the origin and the routes of transmission of a new agent.	P 24/08
France	Transmission of information within all the competent national laboratories is crucial to share knowledge and ensure a rapid and adequate response when a new agent is detected. It also helps ensuring that the national capabilities are not overwhelmed in case of major crisis.	P 24/08
France	Coordination between judiciary authorities and law enforcement authorities is crucial in the operational decision process and during the procedure.	P 24/08
France	A regular communication between all relevant stakeholders at all levels (national, local) should be encouraged in order to ensure the coordination of the response. Links should be established in advance, for example through joint exercises, in order to ensure mutual understanding.	P 24/08
France	Regularly review the documents and procedures put in place at the national and local level in order to ensure an adequate response and training of the relevant stakeholders.	P 24/08
Nigeria	A successful defence against these threats to a nation's public health, whether naturally occurring or deliberately caused, would demand urgent action, early detection warning systems, identification and monitoring of disease progression.	S 24/08
United States	Investigations require coordination between public health (PH) and law enforcement (LE) • Identify the biological agent • Prevent spread of disease • Apprehend those responsible	P 24/08
United States	Challenges: Separate and independent investigations • Mutual awareness or understanding • Information exchange Lack of cooperation between PH and LE may hinder the response	P 24/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	• May causes delays in response	
United States	Goals: • Improve global access to the life sciences to combat infectious disease regardless of its cause • Establish and reinforce norms against the misuse of life sciences • Implement a coordinated approach to influence, identify, inhibit, and interdict those who seek to misuse the life sciences • Reinvigorate the BWC as the premier forum for global outreach and coordination	P 24/08
United States	Joint Investigations: Purpose: For PH and LE agencies to work jointly when responding to biological threats: • Information sharing • Risk/threat assessments • Interviews	P 24/08
Kenya	Take measures to mitigate and control the effects of the attach (the health response) [and] investigate the origin of the attack and identify those responsible (the security response)	P 24/08
Kenya	Needs: • More BSL-3 laboratories • International expert assistance • Well trained health workers • Quarantine facilities • Training of all security forces on biosafety and biosecurity • First responder Unit • Enhanced communication • Collaborative research on early detection equipment • Secure dual-use research laboratories • Secure drinking water sources and food from sabotage • Stockpile personal protective equipment for first responders • Assess national capacity to manage health risks from the deliberate use of biological agents	P 24/08
Canada	In order to have a good prevention strategy, a combination of biosafety, biocontainment, and biosecurity is required.	P 24/08
Pakistan	National preparedness contributes to international capabilities	P 24/08
Pakistan	Objectives: • Detection • Response	P 24/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	• Investigate • Mitigate	
Pakistan	Existing surveillance mechanism needs to be augmented in line with international best practices through: • Rapid chemical and biological detection and protection • Early warning systems • Comprehensive laboratory diagnosis for novel/emerging pathogens • Regional collaborative networking for better response	P 24/08
Pakistan	Requirements: • Surveillance [including] Static Centers [and] Mobile • Expertise [including] Advanced training [and] Facilitation to cope up with deficiencies • Equipment	P 24/08
Pakistan	Equipment: • Sampling equipment • Diagnostic equipment • Decontamination equipment • Availability of proper personal protective equipment • Evacuation/Shelter • Treatment and preventive modalities	P 24/08
Turkey	Bilateral, multilateral, regional and international cooperation significantly enhance our ability not only to minimize the effects of disasters and ensure preparedness, but also to respond effectively and recover easily through the transfer of technology as well as sharing information and resources.	S 24/08
Turkey	That does not exclude provisions of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations upon request by any State Party in the case of alleged use of biological and toxin weapons.	S 24/08
India	An effective and efficient disease surveillance system is crucial for detecting cases of natural or suspicious outbreaks of diseases and planning a response.	S 24/08
India	For management of biological disasters, advanced diagnostic laboratories, sufficient stock of appropriate antibiotics, antiviral substances, immune modulators, vaccines, isolation facilities and other prophylactic measures are needed to be planned.	S 24/08
India	National efforts must go hand in hand with international cooperation.	S 24/08
India	The framework provided by the Biological Weapons Convention, especially Article X, must be fully implemented.	S 24/08
WHO	Global public health security requires coherent and collective actions to develop the systems, networks, tools and interventions needed for timely and effective management of	P 25/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	epidemic risks and events. Global systems and networks that can manage and respond to the threats are needed alongside core infrastructure and capabilities in every country to detect, report and respond to public health risks at their source.	
WHO	IHR defines a risk management process where Member States work together and through the WHO to collectively manage acute public health threats. An effective IHR will protect international public health security by ensuring that events are detected early; reactions are appropriate and based on well-founded risk assessments; the international community is provided timely accurate information; and effective international assistance is brought rapidly to bear to control threats at their source to reduce human suffering, economic and social losses.	P 25/08
WHO	The WHO's mandate in global public health security bestows the responsibility to assist member states with the public health response to any event regardless of its origin.	P 25/08
WHO	What are perceived as gaps between health and security can be transformed into opportunities to build strong public health capabilities that serve to deal with epidemics and public health emergencies whatever their origins.	P 25/08
WHO	WHO's primary role in responding to the intentional release of a biological agent will be to manage the public health and consequences of such an event, in support of affected states, and to communicate real-time public health risk assessments and recommendations to member states. To this end WHO has developed and tested specific standard operating procedures for response to alleged use, including specific indicators of non-natural sources of infection.	P 25/08
WHO	As the specialized UN agency for health with the technical and scientific capacity for detection, characterization, risk assessment and containment of epidemics, WHO recognises its role to provide technical support to the UN and international community in the investigations of alleged use.	P 25/08
WHO	Closer technical collaboration between the WHO and UNODA includes contribution to the relevant review process of the Secretary-General's investigative manuals, training and procedures. WHO has also developed mechanisms aimed at providing relevant support to a UNSG investigation, inter alia, by seconding experts, sharing necessary equipment, field experience, and lessons learned.	P 25/08
UNODA	[UN Secretary General's investigative mechanism:] • Is an impartial and effective tool for investigation of alleged use; • Is not a permanent body but relies on Member States contributions and cooperation in preparation and conduct of investigations; • Builds upon the highest level of expertise (experts and laboratories) provided by Member States; • Is currently being reinvigorated • Involves training as UN fact-finding teams • Involves partnership with international organizations • Requires appropriate resources to make the mechanism fully operational, including sustainable funding from Member States.	P 25/08
UNODA	The UNSG investigative mechanism is a tool of Member States. Their support and efforts	P 25/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	are essential. The roster of experts and laboratories should be regularly updated to preserve their relevance. Experts in the UN investigative team need to be well trained to be able to operate effectively in challenging fields and environments.	
Sweden	Sweden hosted the first training course for the Secretary-General's Mechanism roster experts in 2009. Trained teams of experts are essential for the UNSG Investigative Mechanism to be fully operational and it is important to provide training for additional roster experts appointed by Member States.	P 25/08
South Africa	As regards the UNSG investigative mechanism, we request that UNODA publishes the appendices so that they are available to State Parties.	S 25/08
Georgia and United States	Public health emergencies, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction defy borders and can only be addressed through concerted regional and international cooperation.	P 25/08
Georgia and United States	The need to address common security concerns provides an opportunity for diverse communities, within and across borders, to work collaboratively and build understanding and confidence.	P 25/08
Georgia and United States	Established partnership and communication channels between law enforcement and public health (both at the national and the international level) are critical elements for "connecting the dots" early in a potential bio threat/incident.	P 25/08 & WP.2
Georgia and United States	General areas for consideration: • Prevention/Deterrence • Emergency Assessment/Diagnosis • Emergency Management/ Response • Hazard Mitigation • Evacuation/Shelter/Movement Restrictions • Victim Care • Public Health Investigation/Law Enforcement Apprehension • Recovery/Remediation – Environmental Decontamination/Cleanup – Personal Decontamination – Site Restoration • Implications – Secondary Hazards/Events – Fatalities/Injuries – Property Damage – Service Disruption – Economic Impact – Long-term Health Issues	WP.2

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
Georgia and United States	National Response Plans offer the framework for coordination and response to biological incidents, whether natural or deliberate, and were validated during the H1N1 national responses.	P 25/08 & WP.2
Georgia and United States	Gaps in capabilities and assets may still exist, in particular with regard to providing mental health services, specialized law enforcement units (for collecting, transporting, and testing biological crime scene samples), and sharing information (in particular between public health and law enforcement).	WP.2
Georgia and United States	Since real-world experience does not come often, there is a strong need for more inter-sectoral (including media) training.	P 25/08 & WP.2
Georgia and United States	Early warning and efficient mitigation of biological incidents are contingent on effective implementation of WHO IHRs and national legislation (i.e. on UNSCR 1540 and BWC implementation) to prevent and criminalize activities of non-state actors who seek to acquire and proliferate WMD.	P 25/08 & WP.2
Georgia and United States	There is no mandatory requirement for national law enforcement to pass information to Interpol in case of potential terrorist events even though they may potentially be of international concern. Could law enforcement apply the example of revised WHO IHRs notifications? That is, pass information to Interpol as "law enforcement information of potential international concern" and let Interpol decide whether it is so.	WP.2
Germany	Elements of a joint approach: • Training • Contact • First response • Recognition • Investigation • Action • Communication	P 25/08
China	Relevant international organizations such as WHO, OIE and FAO are expected to intensify their supports and assistance towards developing countries on capacity building in the area of disease surveillance and control, strengthen analytical capacities of infectious disease and veterinary laboratories of such countries, and provide them with technical training on epidemiology.	P 25/08
China	Relevant international organizations are encouraged to provide technical supports on prevention and control of the importing infectious diseases, host technical training on diagnosis technology and risk assessment, and coordinate cooperation between International Reference Laboratories and research institutions of developing countries on research and development of vaccines and diagnostic reagents.	P 25/08
China	Relevant international organizations should strengthen their assistance on construction of bio-laboratories for developing countries and raise their bio-safety and bio-security capacities by providing the most advanced biological protection equipments and technologies.	P 25/08
OIE	Mechanisms for disease detection and control for a natural, deliberate or accidental	P 25/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	release of animal pathogen or emerging pathogen are virtually the same.	
FAO	Broad range of areas of FAO involvement: • epidemiology, including role of wildlife • preparedness and contingency planning • disease surveillance and control • veterinary laboratories • animal production and marketing hygiene • socio-economic impact of animal disease • rapid response	P 25/08
FAO	FAO desires for plant health: • Would like to establish an appropriate GLEWS and CMC equivalent for plant pests and diseases; • Resources are the primary constraint –nowhere near as much funding as for animal diseases; • Expand and build on the existing IPPC system for surveillance, diagnostics and reporting and to include other relevant partners.	P 25/08
FAO	We know what to do and how to do it, we just need resources to do it and it would not take much to get the basics in place on which we can all build.	P 25/08
Germany	Errors as approach to improve: • Failure management culture as cornerstone of preparedness planning • Exercises as chances for error collection • Importance of sharing error insights from uncommon threat situation [both] interdisciplinary and internationally.	P 25/08
Nigeria	A key to successful defence against threat to public health is: • Early detection • Identification • Monitoring progression in a community.	P 25/08
Nigeria	• Enhance Efforts towards strengthening global laboratory network with integrated components for zoonotic disease diagnosis and reporting. • Develop new and improve existing interdisciplinary educational and training programs • Establish a technical multi-disciplinary panel to review current scientific information on drivers of disease emergence. • Provide incentives for disease outbreak notification and also reduce the social and economic repercussions for such early reporting • Convene routine meetings of representatives from the public, private, and civil	P 25/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	sectors to help build trust towards useful information.	
Nigeria	There is need to do a lot more not only for early detection of the disease but also to monitor the ecology and epidemiology of he disease in order to manage it effectively	P 25/08
Switzerland and United States	Preparedness is key: the best international assistance may be assistance before an attack.	P 25/08
Switzerland and United States	Overall responsibility and authority for response lie with national governments.	P 25/08
Switzerland and United States	The ability of the international community to provide effective support depends on affected state's ability to assess and communicate its needs.	P 25/08
Switzerland and United States	Communication: Affected country needs ability to share information about situation, needs, quickly and clearly.	P 25/08
Switzerland and United States	Not always clear who to share information with: relevant entities and how to access their capabilities not always obvious.	P 25/08
Switzerland and United States	Response: Many entities have relevant capabilities; no comprehensive source of information or mechanism to request assistance at global level. (Some exist at regional level or are sector-specific).	P 25/08
Switzerland and United States	Capacity building: Wide range of programs through many organizations. Increase awareness, support and strengthen programs.	P 25/08
Switzerland and United States	Limitations: Lack of expertise, procedures for operating in CBRN environment could severely limit international organizations' ability to respond in some scenarios.	P 25/08
Switzerland and United States	Information exchange: governments and organizations should develop processes for standardized, streamlined exchange of information.	P 25/08
Switzerland and United States	Raise awareness about international capabilities: Organizations/governments with response or capacity-building capabilities should make information more readily accessible. Ideally, all key information accessible in one place.	P 25/08
Switzerland and United States	Build national capacity: Assess, strengthen key capacities before they are needed.	P 25/08
Switzerland and United States	Develop CBRN procedures: Organizations should review, develop, harmonize procedures, regulations, and equipment.	P 25/08
INTERPOL	Increasing coordinated activity between different local, regional and global agencies involved in managing the crisis.	P 25/08
INTERPOL	National level: early activation of the counterterrorism organization.	P 25/08
INTERPOL	Need multidisciplinary groups at national and international levels.	P 25/08
INTERPOL	Framework for sharing information in place between law enforcement and public health.	P 25/08
INTERPOL	Media management: • Decide what information will reach media • Joint elaboration of reports	P 25/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	• Presentation of exact and precise information to the media • Open and honest about actual threat assessment • Pro-active in order to prevent panic and/or irresponsible or tendentious use of information.	
INTERPOL	Emergency planning (pre- and post- attack) • Countries should review their plan in terrorism especially bioterrorism • Many countries might not have a post attack contingency plan • Importance of communicate and teach on these plans.	P 25/08
INTERPOL	Training and preparation of personnel: • Via seminars, international workshops and courses • Frequent, permanent • Programs in police academies.	P 25/08
INTERPOL	• Proper equipment necessary • Countries who lack financial backing will have difficulty to implement full-scale bioterrorism prevention measures.	P 25/08
INTERPOL	• Boost needed for the public health services and response systems (equipment-human resources) • Strengthening actions of migration/customs control • Improving the capacity of laboratories • Increasing intelligence and investigative efforts • Preventive action by controlling and applying physical security measures in high-profile, mass-audience events	P 25/08
INTERPOL	• Establishing of prevention services in high-profile events which would shorten response time • On hand reserves of vaccines • Preparing for installations/areas which would guarantee the isolation and quarantine of those infected	P 25/08
OPCW	Needs: • Protective equipment • Decontamination equipment and decontaminants • Detection equipment • Medical antidotes and treatments • Technical / Expert advice on protective measures	P 25/08
OPCW	OPCW has a leading role among international actors for investigations of alleged use [of chemical weapons] and delivery of assistance.	P 25/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
OPCW	Challenges: • Timely delivery of assistance • Geographical distribution of protective assets • Strategic airlifting capacities • Compatibility of protective equipment	P 25/08
ICRC	In responding to use or alleged use of biological weapons, States Parties to the BWC and international organisations need to consider: • The reality of the contexts in which there may be use or alleged use of biological weapons and the technical, poltical and security complexities that would accompany any international response; • The profound differences between responding to a natural outbreak of disease and an outbreak resulting from hostile use of a biological agent; • The important timelag between recognising an outbreak of disease and establishing whether or not this outbreak was intentional and the security implications of the information gathering process during this period; • The legal, technical and humanitarian implications of assistance to a state party to the BWC as compared to assistance to the victims of deliberate disease; • The complex interface of an international public health response and international security issues; • An employer's duty of care when deploying staff to a potentially contaminated environment.	P 26/08
Australia	The use of a biological or toxin weapon could have a broad range of consequences for an affected state and its citizens: from minor consequences – where the effects would be localised and could be of relatively short duration; to catastrophic consequences – where the effects would be widespread and could be severely disruptive to economic well-being, social functioning and critical infrastructure and not constrained by national boundaries.	P 26/08
Australia	Responding to an alleged use of a biological or toxin weapon can be complicated by the nature of the attack scenario. Biological agents could be deployed by an adversary covertly or overtly. An overt attack would have a scene for first response teams to respond to. However, with a covert attack, there would not necessarily be a scene to respond to. Public health officials would likely be the first to recognise the covert release of a biological agent.	P 26/08
Australia	Viewing an alleged use of a biological or toxin weapon as a health or biohazard emergency is essential for states to develop and maintain focused response and recovery capabilities – whether such capabilities are deployed following a domestic attack or deployed internationally at the request of another affected state.	P 26/08
Australia	Depending on the nature of the alleged use of a biological or toxin weapon and depending on the security environment in which the incident might occur, the assistance a state might provide to a requesting state could take on various forms and be relevant to various tasks, including assisting immediately with: • identification, containment and neutralisation of hazards;	P 26/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	• disease detection and diagnosis; • provision of medical support; • provision of public information; • provision of basic humanitarian needs, such food and water; • management of affected populations; • support to incident investigation; and • the attendant logistical support required for any of the above.	
Australia	There is often a high level of commonality between responding to natural disasters and responding to an alleged biological or toxin weapon attack. This commonality is encapsulated in the policies of an all-hazards approach, which engenders stronger capacity to deal with crises of varying natures without necessarily investing in unique capabilities which may already exist within other agencies. Focusing the attention of first responders on clear, whole-of-government emergency management procedures thus assists states in responding effectively across the range of possible health and biohazard crisis scenarios. This includes situations where a state is responding to a request for assistance from another state.	P 26/08
Australia	Clear chains of command among responding agencies in a whole-of-government emergency response need to be established and exercised.	P 26/08
Australia	Because responding agencies are required to work in close cooperation, there need to be opportunities – through joint planning and realistic training exercises – to gain knowledge and understanding of the roles and operating cultures of national agencies, sub-national agencies and non-government service providers. Without such planning and training exercises, the levels of cooperation achieved in responding to a real emergency may be less than optimal.	P 26/08
Chile	Projections and Challenges: • To develop a multidisciplinary rapid response team • To develop models of sectoral and intersectoral work in Sanitary Offices and designated ports. • To develop training projects to enhance travellers' health and sanitary inspection of at ports and vessels. • Simulations to maintain team capacities • Epidemiology is the first step to detect, identify and stop outbreaks. • Intersectoral partnerships are crucial.	P 26/08
Chile	Include in one single legal instrument the regulations of the different international conventions and agreements on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction.	P 26/08
Chile	Foster the interaction among the different stakeholders on matters concerning security and a first response, governmental as well as private, in order to be ready to face any eventual use of weapons of mass destruction or their precursors.	P 26/08
Chile	Elaborate a control procedure of precursors and raw materials, used for the manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, which could be based on the model used by the CWC.	P 26/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
South Africa	Procedures for obtaining assistance, investigations and involvement of international organisations differ	P 26/08
South Africa	Use may result in: disease outbreak with no knowledge of a specific incident; or overt use resulting in an incident (e.g. anthrax letters).	P 26/08
South Africa	Disease outbreaks due to BW use are managed in the same manner as naturally occurring outbreaks by public health or veterinary systems, while investigation and epidemiological processes will differ.	P 26/08
South Africa	Investigation is aimed at determining the cause, source of infection and collecting evidence – Epidemiology and laboratory support play a major role.	P 26/08
South Africa	Overt use resulting in an incident is managed according to standard Hazmat incident management principles.	P 26/08
South Africa	The Convention spells out processes to obtain assistance from other States Parties, but the affected state may also obtain assistance via coordination by international organisations (WHO, OIE)	P 26/08
South Africa	The Convention provides for investigation sanctioned by the Security Council. The only existing mechanism to conduct investigations is the UNSG investigation mechanism that is insufficient, was recently updated, but its status is unclear.	P 26/08
South Africa	Disease management will be the same as for naturally occurring outbreaks.	P 26/08
South Africa	Investigative epidemiology will play a major role.	P 26/08
South Africa	Lab support will be directed toward diagnostic work as well as forensic work. Difficulty is laboratories that may be used for forensic work that will satisfy all parties.	P 26/08
South Africa	Alleged use by non-state actors: • Primarily a domestic issue that is managed according to domestic procedures • States may seek assistance from other states directly and/or through international organisations (WHO,OIE) • Investigation similar as for use by states – aim is domestic according to own legal requirements • Most developing states the forensic capabilities for this type of investigation are lacking	P 26/08
China	• Improving plan systems for public health emergencies. • Formulated emergency contingency plans at all levels. • Set up emergency response command centres at national or local levels. • Establish advisory committee and expert advisory system for national public health emergency.	P 26/08
China	Set up inter-agency and cross-region mechanism for prevention and control of infectious disease.	P 26/08
China	Designate agency for biological test and identification for anti-terrorism.	P 26/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
China	Measures for mass gatherings: prevention and control: • Reinforced infectious diseases surveillance and preparedness for medical care and rescue; • Strengthened monitoring and supervision of food, cosmetics and water supplies for special events; • Intensified prevention efforts and security inspections at key facilities in the specific time period; • Improved biosafety and biosecurity of laboratories handling pathogenic microorganisms; • Enhanced inspection and quarantine of inbound personnel, materials and mails; • Information release and publicity of health security;	P 26/08
China	Measures for mass gatherings: emergency response: • Improved emergency response system and established a comprehensive supporting system led by governments, involved by relevant departments, supported by expert advisory and implemented by technical agencies. • Established medical rescue advisory information system for prevention of and response to nuclear, biological and chemical terrorist attacks so as to provide technical advices for decision-making departments.	P 26/08
China	Establish an international platform for collaboration in science and technology - States Parties with advanced and mature technologies are encouraged to share their knowledge and experience with other States Parties through training courses and the provision of equipment, and help improve the capacity of countries in need.	P 26/08
China	Establish a global platform for sharing biological resources. Biological warfare agents and toxins should be shared according to the established practice of relevant international organizations, which will help States Parties better understand BW agents and provide technical information on pathogens for the investigation of the allegations.	P 26/08
China	Establish and improve relevant legal frameworks and strengthen the supervision and management of risky research activities to regulate scientific and research behaviour.	P 26/08
France	Systematic and large investigations done on sentinel populations (travellers) is an important issue.	P 26/08
France	Interest must be attached to every agent with potential to affect humans everywhere.	P 26/08
France	Basic epidemiological, biological and clinical knowledge must be acquired and updated. Diagnostic tools must be developed and made available.	P 26/08
Iraq	• Building capacity in the field of epidemiological investigation • Building international networking and electronic surveillance • Technical supporting to raise the biosafety up to level 3.	P 26/08
Indonesia	Recognize the need to develop, strengthen and maintain the capacity to detect, report and respond to public health events.	P 26/08
Indonesia	Actions to be taken:	P 26/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	• Maintain a safe, secure and sustainable capacity • Best practices on biological safety and security • Build and improve capacity to detect, diagnose and track outbreaks of highly infectious diseases • Build effective and sustainable partnerships between developed and developing countries.	
Indonesia	Laboratory services are essential to identify and confirm the causes of outbreaks. Accurate diagnosis and pathogen characterization is a cornerstone in the control of disease. Improvements to detection and diagnostic capabilities are important.	P 26/08
Indonesia	Infectious disease outbreaks can be contained and suppressed through early detection, immediate response and cooperation and support.	P 26/08
Indonesia	Basic cell and molecular biology play an important role in building manpower and capacity in detection of diseases.	P 26/08
Indonesia	Raise awareness and inform on the importance of life science research – the early detection of outbreaks is closely related to the ability of laboratories to conduct early diagnosis of diseases.	P 26/08
Indonesia	Assistance and coordination in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons – the need for international collaboration in building the national capacity: • Education and awareness raising • Capabilities in disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and preparedness • Infrastructure support of BSL3 • Operational assistance grant • Training and advocacy on biosafety and biosecurity	P 26/08
Indonesia	Improving National Capacity: • Ensure the sustainability of maintenance and management – Continuous funding support, maximize existing resources and facilities to enhance effectiveness and efficiencies • Strengthening and improving laboratory biosafety practices and biosecurity– long term commitment • Ensuring quality performance of laboratories • Expand the use of safe and modern diagnostics – need to build national capacity in fundamental and translational research through joint activity • Raise awareness of biologically threats globally - introduce Dual Use and Code of Conduct through academic curricula	P 26/08
Switzerland	Needs: • Diagnostic capacity for rare and/or dangerous pathogens which cannot be provided by public or private laboratories • Rapid tests for these pathogens through laboratory analysis	P 26/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	• Rapid access to diagnostic facilities, close coordination with first-response organizations	
	• High-quality diagnostics	
	• Security in case of crises through networking and redundancies	
	• Interoperability: prevention, identification, control	
Switzerland	• Increase the crisis-resilience of primary diagnostic capacities for biological incidents	P 26/08
	• Establish environmental analysis for biological incidents	
	• Subsidiary tasks in human and veterinary medicine during an incident	
	• Decentralised primary diagnostic capabilities: short transport distances for samples, rapid analysis; geographically comprehensive diagnostic capacities, take the burden off the national reference centres	
	• Use existing infrastructure.	
Mexico	• Planning is essential for a correct response	P 26/08
	• Surveillance needs epidemiological intelligence	
	• Early warning is essential for known and unknown defined diseases	
	• Detailed standard operating procedures are essential for proper planning	
	• Flexible protocols to adapt to unexpected events	
	• International collaboration is a key component	
	• Working as a network (federal-state) is a basic key element to succeed and to facilitate global communication	
	• External quality assessment (international standards) for laboratories is basic	
	• Implementation of routine, global systematic communication and of the IHR	
	• Honest and transparent communication is essential.	
Mexico	To encourage and facilitate the collaboration and exchange of information, in the national and international arenas for analysis, follow up and evaluation of incidents and operations, in order to prevent and fight crime, in any of its forms, including terrorism and bioterrorism..	P 27/08
Mexico	Gather and process accurate and real time information:	P 27/08
	• When and where crimes occur	
	• Suspects have been identified	
	• Follow up actions to stop criminals.	
Mexico	Outcomes:	P 27/08
	• Real time information on the occurrence of criminal events	
	• How, when and who is committing the crime.	
Mexico	Decision making based on information analysis (Graphics, maps, police deployment and	P 27/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	fatigue), investigations for rapid reaction and prevent ion of crime.	
Mexico	Sources of information: statistic and historical archives, voice records, reports, video, data.	P 27/08
Romania	Important factors: • Testing the first reaction and consequence management capabilities in a crisis involving terrorist use of biological material. • Exercising coordination of specialized units dealing with medical emergencies (first aid, triage, evacuation). • Intervention of CBRN expert units for containment of dangerous agent • Public communication management in a crisis situation.	P 27/08
Romania	Exercises contribute to increasing the cooperation and coordination between ministries, agencies and civil society in dealing with bioterrorism crisis.	P 27/08
Romania	Further dialogues with the public sector, academia, technical experts could support governmental efforts in a terrorist crisis and provide for a better involvement and cooperation of the civil society.	P 27/08
Romania	Better communication with mass media and carrying out security education campaigns are useful tools for raising public awareness on these issues and improve people's reactions in crisis situations.	P 27/08
Brazil	The demand for the provision of assistance has to be upon the request of the State. As with all international support, it should always be upon the request of the affected country, and be provided within the parameters that the State required in accordance to the assessments of its national authorities. To mitigate the effects of a biological attack, for instance, it is important that assistance is provided as defined by the State. Resources for such assistance could also be made through know-how sharing and cooperation, mainly in diagnostic training, medicine, vaccines and equipment.	S 27/08
Brazil	Regional consultations could be a valid context as a first step for international cooperation. In a broader context, in a confirmed violation or breach of the Convention, as stated in Article VI, that the Conference is the appropriate and capable body to suggest to the Security Council the best way to act.	S 27/08
Brazil	On the "link between national and international capabilities and mechanisms for building capacity to identify or punish the perpetrators of an attack" it is important to point out that, in what regards capacity building, international mechanisms could be a positive action, but punishment of perpetrators should be compatible with international law for that matter.	S 27/08
Brazil	The procedures could vary depending on the interpretations of what is a "suspicious outbreak". The term is ambiguous when translated to other non-official languages of the United Nations, such as Portuguese, allowing different interpretations. Since that ambiguity does not provide legal certainty, the term "alleged use" is preferable.	S 27/08
Brazil	On the matter of "strengthening existing international organizations and networks working on infectious diseases, in particular those of the WHO, FAO, OIE and IPPC", the provision of information by a State Party should be in conformity with its obligation to each of the above international organizations. Information should be delivered by explicit	S 27/08

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	national authorities to the specific international organizations to which they are related. In this matter, information flow should also be well-organized and efficient in order to avoid duplication.	
Brazil	Regarding the "promotion of the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes and of international cooperation in this field", there should also be transfers in know how and voluntary intellectual property rights (or patent licensing) in cases of a biological attack or in cases of severe pandemics outbreak. On cooperation "in the use of biosciences and genetic engineering for peaceful purposes through active association with United Nations institutions", national and international laws should be followed especially in cases of joint scientific research.	S 27/08
Brazil	In matters related to capacity building, there are significant demands in the sectors of health, safety and others areas. There are also needs in developing countries for technology transfer to build more efficient response and defences.	S 27/08
Brazil	On cooperation to build national capacities, it is important to stress that the specialized international entities and organizations act within their respective mandates and attributions.	S 27/08
Brazil	States Parties should keep in mind that cooperation and assistance under the Convention must have a clear distinction between attributions of health authorities from those of national security institutions, which should be free to cooperate, coordinate actions and exchange information, but must restrict themselves to their mandated competency in that same way that international organizations respect each other’s jurisdiction.	S 27/08
United States	In order to protect public health and safety by apprehending those responsible and mitigating health consequences, deliberate biological threat events require a coordinated response between law enforcement and public health.	WP.1
United States	While a response requires coordination between law enforcement and public health, each group may be hesitant to share specific-types of information because of actual or perceived information sharing limitations.	WP.1
United States	Strong professional relationships between law enforcement and public health allow for greater exchanges of information since individuals generally develop trust in their counterparts once they have met and worked with them prior to an incident.	WP.1
United States	An agreement or memorandum of understanding allows law enforcement and public health to move beyond personal contacts and formalizes the concepts and principles for conducting joint investigations of intentional biological threats.	WP.1
United States	The joint interviews allow both law enforcement and public health the opportunity to evaluate the initial information collected utilizing the expertise of each investigator, which could aid in identifying the source of the infection and/or the perpetrators and/or identify needs for additional information or avenues of investigation. If interviews are conducted separately, one investigator may not recognize the importance or significance of a piece of information, which could be critical to their counterpart’s investigation.	WP.1
United States	A joint public health and law enforcement investigation improves responses to intentional biological events because it increases information exchange and mutually supports the investigative goals of both disciplines. Joint investigations training is an effective way to promote the use of joint investigations.	WP.1

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	Coordination and information sharing mechanisms, improvement of capacities and technologies, joint exercises, lessons learnt and sharing of best practices are examples of EU actions which support and complement the actions taken by Member States.	WP.3
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	Assistance could include expert teams and equipment for the diagnosis (release of field epidemiologists), support to health care (personnel and specialized modules), specialized equipments as well vaccines and medicinal products, protective gears, etc. Vaccines, serums and other related medical assistance can be part of the overall emergency assistance.	WP.3
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	The successful response to a CBRN incident may depend on the availability and effective use countermeasures.	WP.3
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	• Risk assessment of public health impact and risk management…; • Early alerting and communication systems linking up EU countries; and • Expert advice on prevention, treatment and mitigation.	WP.3
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	• Prevention: ensuring that unauthorized access to CBRN materials of concern is as difficult as possible; • Detection: having the capability to detect CBRN materials if control over them is lost; • Preparedness and response: being able to efficiently respond to incidents involving CBRN materials and recover from them as quickly as possible.	WP.3
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	As regards the response to CBRN attacks or incidents, it is often impossible to quickly ascertain whether it was caused by a malicious act or an accident. Consequently, regardless of the nature of an event, the response to an incident is essentially the same.	WP.3
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	Emergency planning: well-developed pre-emergency plans and emergency response plans designed for CBRN incidents are the foundation of efficient crisis- and post-crisis management… All response plans need to be exercised regularly. Such exercises should include criminal investigation and forensics teams.	WP.3
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	Such response plans should not only exist for public authorities; they should also be developed by all operators handling high-risk CBRN materials and for other high-risk facilities.	WP.3
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	Domestic and international information flows: smooth and clear communication and information flows between all stakeholders in a crisis situation are preconditions for an effective response… Consideration should also be given to making better use of existing information exchange systems	WP.3
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	Strengthening decontamination capacity	WP.3
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	Modelling tools play a key role in planning processes and during an actual response to a CBRN emergency. Regardless of the nature of an event (act of war, terrorist attack, traffic accident, industrial accident), the analysis of the movement of a cloud of dangerous substances (i.e. its atmospheric dispersion) and the estimation of the concentration of dangerous substances in the atmosphere constitute some of the most important response variables during a major accident involving dangerous substances.	WP.3

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	Criminal investigations: the response to CBRN incidents, in particular terrorist acts, also includes the necessity to conduct criminal investigations with a view to bringing the perpetrators to justice. The importance of judicial cooperation with regard to terrorist activities involving CBRN materials should be underlined.	WP.3
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	While the probability of a release of a biological weapon is low ... intentions of particularly non-state groups to use one are real.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	Preparedness and capacity building are keys to any biological crisis management and all the relevant actors on international, regional, state, and local levels are required to put in place preventive measures. These include, inter alia, public awareness, national regulations and punitive measures to mitigate such threats.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	The contemporary world is more than ever interconnected and diseases travel fast. A biological weapon scenario could most likely have a cross-border dimension. Preparedness and response mechanisms must be embedded with this assumption and cooperation, building of networks and good communication are imperative.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	The role of international organizations is essential not only due to the fact that public health threats have no borders, but because the regime governing non-proliferation of biological weapons is not supported by any standing international bureaucratic structure – unlike nuclear and chemical weapons.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	States have to prevent misuse of biological agents. To this end, it is necessary to put in place an appropriate regulatory framework, including biosafety and biosecurity, criminal law, administrative measures. Capacities on biosafety and biosecurity have to be developed. Biosafety, biosecurity and bio-risk management must be the highest priority for anyone handling pathogens of humans, as well as of animals and plants.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	In addition to governmental and academic agencies and institutes, this also includes actors in the private sector such as the pharmaceutical industry, food industry, transportation industry, etc. It is important to create a culture of biosafety and biosecurity.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	For achieving preparedness, there are both national and international roles and responsibilities. Mechanisms need to be clearly defined before a potential incident or attack occurs, as a prerequisite for responding with speed and effectiveness. The goals are to prevent and to reduce the impact of human, animal, and plant diseases and pests.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	Useful tools include: disease surveillance systems, alerts and early warning, regular updates of preparedness and response plans and contingency planning.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	International organizations can provide to States the following elements of cooperation and support: global disease surveillance, strengthening of national public health and laboratory systems, expertise, technical tools and support, disease and threat specific technical guidance, national regulations and standards, training, building capacity for crisis management, facilitating rapid response to crises, help with early detection and collecting epidemiological evidence etc. Overall, international organizations facilitate sharing of expertise, supplies and resources.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	In order to ensure an adequate response on national level to the use of a biological weapon, connectedness among a wide range of stakeholders – from sectors of health, justice, environment, commerce, agriculture, law enforcement, intelligence, media, and foreign affairs – is essential. Often for adoption of appropriate legislature and other measures, an actual biological incident is a watershed event.	WP.4

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	Sensitizing public health providers to biological weapons use scenarios is a key element of any emergency response management and efforts are ongoing to overcome insufficient knowledge of and experience with handling potential effects of biological weapons. Public health providers must be educated about the diseases that might result from biological weapons use. Particular challenges can be posed by novel and exotic biological agents.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	In responding to alleged use of biological weapons, time and communication are of essence. Early detection of the event is key, although still remains as one of the major challenges. First symptoms manifest themselves several days after victims have become infected and generally as non-specific. This is why cross-sector communication and vigilance cannot be overemphasized to recognize the emergence of unusual patterns.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	Cooperation and communication between the public health sector and law enforcement agencies is indispensable in order to detect, identify and respond to an unusual outbreak that might have an intentional origin, without unnecessary delay.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	In the case of use of a biological weapon, immediate priority would be given to assisting victims and to containment of the disease outbreak. Investigation would be secondary, but nevertheless crucial in order to understand the pattern of disease spread, to contain the outbreak, and to pursue perpetrators. There is a need to preserve and protect evidence during investigation of an alleged use.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	In the case of an unusual and suspicious disease outbreak, international organizations can help with an investigation of the allegation.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	Cooperation and coordination of activities performed by different agencies are crucial for recognizing an event in order to be able to mount a successful response, including investigations.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	Biological detection and analysis technology relevant to investigation and response to alleged BW use is a rapidly developing area. Portable, commercial detectors are becoming available and sophisticated technology for differentiation of microbial strains, having a key role in determining if attack has occurred and in attribution and response, is becoming increasingly automated and available.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	[There is a need for] high sensitivity and specificity of developed technologies, their versatility for analysis of different types of samples, being able to differentiate between biological agents endemic in a region or imported from other regions, as well as avoiding false positive results.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	There has been great progress in development of new technologies for protection of personnel, detection in the field, rapid and sensitive diagnosis, personal protective equipment, containment laboratories, new vaccines, more effective drugs and modern and effective decontamination tools and chemicals. However, it is absolutely critical to develop a biosafety and biosecurity practice and culture, and to offer training to agencies and individuals on how to apply these technologies.	WP.4
Belgium (on behalf of EU)	Biological detection equipment can provide capability to identify certain agents. Fast availability of the decontamination equipment is an essential asset.	WP.4
United Kingdom	A key objective is to strengthen international capabilities for responding to, and investigating allegations of, BW use. Much remains to be done and continued national and international efforts are required to sustain and improve capabilities.	WP.6

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
United Kingdom	Not least because infectious diseases, whether naturally occurring or deliberate, can readily cross borders, a response to the threat or actual use of biological weapons cannot be undertaken at a purely national level: it needs to be global and cooperative amongst States Parties and a broad range of international organisations.	WP.6
United Kingdom	Efforts to improve capacity building to combat infectious disease, especially surveillance and diagnosis, also helps strengthen the BWC as the capabilities to identify naturally occurring outbreaks of disease are largely the same as those required to identify deliberate use of pathogens and toxins to cause disease in humans, animals and plants.	WP.6
United Kingdom	[Targeted assistance projects] that help to improve disease surveillance, detection and diagnostics, biosafety and biosecurity, and to ensure a sustainable and legitimate future for institutes working on public, animal or plant health, potentially [result in] benefits for the institutes and their host governments, … through better understanding of new biological threats and in preparing for and responding to alleged use of biological or toxin weapons.	WP.6
United Kingdom	The UNSG mechanism provides the only international system for investigating cases of alleged BW use and thereby offers an independent and authoritative mechanism for gathering facts that could be used as a basis for further action.	WP.6
United Kingdom	[The UNSG mechanism] offers the prospect of prompt and effective investigations that gather evidence that may help identify the origins of any attack, and may allow the UNSG to facilitate, as appropriate, provision of aid by the international community, which might help mitigate the effects.	WP.6
United Kingdom	It is important to ensure that this mechanism is effective, [States Parties are encouraged to] support the UNODA in its initiatives to ensure that the mechanism is effective.	WP.6
United Kingdom	Preparation is essential for an effective response. Improvising a response during an incident is unlikely to be effective. One can never be totally prepared for all eventualities, but if the basics are right, especially the command and control of any response to a BW incident and recovery, then mitigation of the adverse consequences of any use of BW is achievable.	WP.7
United Kingdom	Our collective objective is to prevent a biological attack (the BTWC has a part to play in this strategy) and where that is not possible, to put in place measures to ensure that we can recover from it quickly and with minimal loss of life. This requires continuing preparation and planning across a range of government departments and agencies; police, fire and rescue services; health professionals and the armed forces.	WP.7
United Kingdom	Preparation to respond to a [biological] attack and mitigate its effects is of vital importance. … activities to achieve a multi-agency national response, including organizational and planning resources, training, equipping, establishing facilities, team-building and coordination.	WP.7
United Kingdom	Early detection and diagnosis assists in timely and effective medical intervention; … review options for enhancing medical response through stockpiling drugs and vaccines to mitigate the effects of exposure to an attack; …review of detection, identification and monitoring equipment and collaboration with industry and international partners to assess biological detection equipment.	WP.7
United Kingdom	Effective command, control and communications are essential elements in an ability to respond effectively to any biological weapons attack	WP.7

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
United Kingdom	Important activities include training of personnel who would be expected to deal directly with the consequences of an attack. It is essential to ensure that the levels of trained and equipped police officers, fire and rescue service decontamination units and hazardous area response teams are maintained.	WP.7
United Kingdom	Provision of timely and reliable scientific advice in a crisis, both to first responders and decision-makers, is another essential element in an effective national capability to respond.	WP.7
United Kingdom	Planning for recovery and decontamination is required at the earliest opportunity so that a return to normality can be achieved as soon as possible.	WP.7
United Kingdom	Regular exercises – table-top and field – are essential tools in building and sustaining an effective capability to contain the consequences of any BW attack, to restore confidence and to recover rapidly with minimal loss of life and disruption to daily life and the economic well-being of the country.	WP.7
United Kingdom	Regular exercises involving all key players – from first responders to law enforcement agencies – are essential as part of national preparedness planning for responding to any biological weapons attack.	WP.7
United Kingdom	Exercises enable us to validate plans and systems thoroughly, train frontline responders, and highlight vulnerabilities. Planning for emergencies cannot be considered reliable until it is exercised and has proved to be workable, especially since false confidence may be placed in the integrity of a written plan.	WP.7
United Kingdom	Lessons learned … include the need to address fully the command, control and coordination of multi-agency assets during the initial response, and to increase the understanding of processes and authorities among all the agencies involved as the operation progresses. A good appreciation of the threat and risk, and rapid processing of real-time information during the operation are also important. Specific points to note are: • Exercises provide a rare opportunity, in a safe environment, to develop strong working relationships with colleagues in a multiagency environment which aids closer working in the event of a real incident; • The health community is used to working in a consensus rather than a command and control environment - exercises help to identify and reinforce training needs within the health community to enable, for example, more effective strategic leadership in a crisis situation; • Scientific advice, when required, should be provided in a timely and easily understandable way to aid the decision making process and not confound it. There should also be a single agreed source of scientific advice; • Organisations need to know where and how they can access appropriate expert advice rapidly; • Barriers to information sharing between organisations, such as health and law enforcement, should be removed or minimised wherever possible through agreed protocols; • All organisations need to understand the importance of evidence and the evidence chain in a deliberate release incident, and the constraints and limitations that this imposes;	WP.7

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	• The training and placement of liaison officers in responding organisations improves the effectiveness of interagency communication and information flow; • Business continuity plans need to reflect the increased capacity required to respond to emergencies; • Recovery is often overlooked during the initial stages of an acute response; this is a serious weakness. Recovery should be planned from the start of an incident; • Outputs to the media from incidents must be agreed, coordinated and timely to prevent contradictory or unhelpful information being released.	
United Kingdom	A key aspect for countering the threat is to reduce the likelihood of an attack. This involves ensuring that those intent on carrying out an attack are disrupted and brought to justice, and that CBRN materials acquired, or used in any attack, can be identified and attributed.	WP.7
United Kingdom	A sophisticated forensic capability may be required to provide evidence in the event of prosecution of those planning a [biological] attack.	WP.7
United Kingdom	The success of efforts to improve capabilities in this area depends on collaboration across government departments and agencies, the responder community, the private sector and with international partners.	WP.7
Germany	Streamlining policies of all constituencies involved in integrated management is a permanent challenge and requires not only joint training but also permanent assessment of incidents, both real life and exercises.	WP.10
Germany	Sharing of error and failure insights from uncommon risk and threat situations should be an important part of interdisciplinary and international communication and exercise planning.	WP.10
Germany	Once established and approved methods and hardware need to undergo permanent processes of development and technical improvement for optimizing response capabilities and minimizing risks for personnel involved in real life scenarios.	WP.10
Germany	Training of personnel in personal protective equipment is a prerequisite for enabling optimal reaction in real life incidents.	WP.10
Germany	Medical symptoms of an infectious disease may deviate from normal patterns in case an infectious agent is distributed in an unusual way by terrorists. Correct and timely medical diagnosis as well as linking the outbreak of disease to a terrorist attack may be delayed. For minimizing lead time for detection of an alleged or real biological attack close cooperation and joint training of public health and law enforcement are an indispensable prerequisite.	WP.11
Germany	[Challenges:] • Acute perception in politics and society; • Often delayed recognition of attack; • Insufficient knowledge and experience for risk assessment; • Insufficient experience with related disease patterns; • Rapid depletion of staff and structural resources;	WP.11

Delegation	*Text*	*Source*
	• Training deficits in first response structures (public health services, primary care facilities, law enforcement agencies).	
Japan	• Strengthen the public health care system through the implementation of infectious disease countermeasures and vaccine stockpiling; • Strengthen cooperation between relevant organizations and enhance their response readiness; • Strengthen security and precautionary measures for the prevention of terrorist attacks and the control of biological and chemical agents; • Strengthen the response capacities of the police, the self-defense forces, the fire department, the coast guard and other relevant organizations; • Provide accurate and timely information to the public.	WP.13
Republic of Korea	In order to minimize the consequences of a potential use of biological or toxin weapons a national system must be in place, and international cooperation and coordination among States and other relevant organizations is indispensable.	WP.14

List of abbreviations

EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
NAM	Group of the Non-aligned Movement and Other States
OIE	World Organisation for Animal Health
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
WHO	World Health Organization

Annex II

List of documents

Symbol	*Title*
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/1	Provisional agenda for the Meeting of Experts
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/2	Provisional programme of work for the Meeting of Experts
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/3	Report of the Meeting of Experts
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/INF.1	Previous agreements and understandings under the Convention relevant to the provision of assistance and coordination in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons – Submitted by the Implementation Support Unit
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/INF.2	The role of international organizations in the provision of assistance and coordination in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons – Submitted by the Implementation Support Unit
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/INF.3 and Corr.1	Technical guidance for preparing for and responding to alleged use of biological or toxin weapons – Submitted by the Implementation Support Unit
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/INF.4 and Add.1 [English/French/Spanish only]	List of participants
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/WP.1 [English only]	Joint public health and law enforcement investigations: "enhancing relationships to improve readiness" – Submitted by the United States of America
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/WP.2 [English only]	Southern Caucasus collaboration and partnership in countering biological threats – Submitted by Georgia and the United States of America
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/WP.3 [English only]	European Union capacities to respond to CBRN attacks and CBRN incidents – Submitted by Belgium on behalf of the European Union
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/WP.4 [English only]	Moderators' summary of the International Workshop on Responding to the Alleged Use of Biological Weapons – Submitted by Belgium on behalf of the European Union
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/WP.5 [English only]	European Union cooperative initiatives to improve biosafety and biosecurity – Submitted by Belgium on behalf of the European Union
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/WP.6 [English only]	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland activities on international cooperation and assistance on responding to alleged use of biological or toxin weapons – Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Symbol	*Title*
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/WP.7 [English only]	United Kingdom activities and capabilities for responding to a biological weapons attack – Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/WP.8[a]/ [Chinese only]	China's preparedness for and response to public health emergencies – Submitted by China
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/WP.9[a]/ [Chinese only]	China's views and propositions on the international assistance and coordination in the case of alleged use of biological weapons – Submitted by China
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/WP.10 [English only]	Technical determinants in management of biological risks: lessons learned – Submitted by Germany
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/WP.11 [English only]	Joint training as a key resource for improving biopreparedness – Submitted by Germany
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/WP.12 [English only]	German activities on improving national detection capabilities: First International Proficiency Test on the Analysis of Ricin – Submitted by Germany
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/WP.13 [English only]	National preparedness against biological threats – Submitted by Japan
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/WP.14 [English only]	Republic of Korea national disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and public health care system and participation in the global cooperation network – Submitted by the Republic of Korea
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/WP.15 [English only]	Black ICE II bioterrorism response international coordination exercise – Submitted by Switzerland and the United States of America
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/CRP.1 [English only]	Considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions on the topics under discussion at the Meeting
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/CRP.2 [English only]	Draft report of the Meeting of Experts
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/MISC.1 [English/French/Spanish only]	Provisional list of participants

[a] An English unofficial translation is included after the Chinese text.